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Abstract
Background Not much is known about Do-Not-
Attempt-Resuscitation (DNAR) decision-making for
people with intellectual disabilities (IDs). The aim
of this study was to clarify the problems and pitfalls
of non-emergency DNAR decision-making for
people with IDs, from the perspective of ID
physicians.
Methods This qualitative study was based on semi-
structured individual interviews, focus group
interviews and an expert meeting, all recorded
digitally and transcribed verbatim. Forty ID
physicians and trainees were interviewed about
problems, pitfalls and dilemmas of DNAR
decision-making for people with IDs in the
Netherlands. Data were analysed using Grounded
Theory procedures.
Results The core category identiﬁed was ‘Patient-
related considerations when issuing DNAR orders’.
Within this category, medical considerations were the
main contributory factor for the ID physicians. Eval-
uation of quality of life was left to the relatives and was
sometimes a cause of conﬂicts between physicians
and relatives. The category of ‘The decision-maker
role’ was as important as that of ‘The decision pro-
cedure in an organisational context’. The procedure
of issuing a non-emergency DNAR order and the
embedding of this procedure in the health care orga-
nisation were important for the ID physicians.
Conclusion The theory we developed clariﬁes that
DNAR decision-making for people with IDs is com-
plex and causes uncertainties. This theory offers a
sound basis for training courses for physicians to deal
with uncertainties regarding DNAR decision-making,
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as well as a method for advance care planning. Health
care organisations are strongly advised to implement a
procedure regarding DNAR decision-making.
Keywords advance care planning, decisions, Do-
Not-Attempt-Resuscitation, end of life, ethics,
intellectual disability, palliative care
Introduction
DNAR means Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation, and
this paper discusses pre-emptively issued DNAR
orders.These are legal orders issued in advance which
tell a medical team not to perform cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation on a patient. ID physicians (physicians
whose caseload consists exclusively of people with
IDs) do not ﬁnd DNAR orders an easy matter. Many
aspects in the process of DNAR decision-making are
unclear, causing feelings of uncertainty among ID
physicians. Although a DNAR order does not affect
other medical treatments, such orders are often part
of a broader range of end-of-life decisions and ﬁt into
the concept of advance care planning (Kingsbury
2009). End-of-life decisions are deﬁned as those
decisions at the end of life which may shorten life, but
are not aimed at shortening a patient's life, and need to
be discussed with all stakeholders including the
patient, next-of-kin and the attending physician. End-
of-life decisions including DNAR are relevant to
signiﬁcant numbers of people with IDs (Wagemans
et al. 2010) as well as to the general Dutch population
(playing a role in 58% of all deaths in 2010)
(Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al. 2012). Advance care
planning is the process whereby patients, in
consultation with professionals and often supported
by their relatives, discuss and lay down their
preferences for future health care and prepare for
future treatment decisions. Advance care planning
appears to improve end-of-life care and patient and
family satisfaction (Detering et al., 2010).
In everyday life, resuscitation attempts are
unsuccessful in 70–98% of cases and effects after
successful intervention are not clear (Lippert et al.
2012). Despite the fact that the chance of survival
features prominently in discussions, DNAR decisions
are made on the basis of problems at a given moment,
rather than on the basis of expected survival (de Vos
et al. 1998). When the burden of resuscitation is not in
balance with the beneﬁts for a patient, resuscitation is
called futile and is not in any patient's best interests.
The concept of futility, however, is not very helpful in
decision-making as it is very subjective, and it is
difﬁcult to establish whether resuscitation is futile or
not (Stewart 2012). In most European countries, the
current professional opinion is that physicians cannot
be forced to provide any treatment, including car-
diopulmonary resuscitation, that they believe will not
be successful or where the risks are likely to outweigh
the beneﬁts. Physicians do not need the patient's or
the family's consent in decisions about futile care, al-
though they should as a general rule discuss it with the
patient, or with the family of a patient who lacks the
capacity to make their own decisions (Dyer 2012).
Because the chances of survival are unclear, physi-
cians can hardly be certain about a DNAR decision
and decisions cannot be made without consulting the
patient or their relatives (de Vos 2001).
Although legislation differs among countries,
legislation in most European countries implies that
physicians are ultimately responsible for the end-of-
life decisions (Welie et al. 2005, Joyce 2010). The
European Resuscitation Council Guidelines states
that it should be clear to relatives that the ultimate
DNAR decision is made by a doctor and that the
relatives do not need to carry the burden of such a
decision (Lippert et al. 2012). The position of Dutch
physicians is described in the Contract of Medical
Treatment Act (WGBO) (WGBO 1994). This act
states that Dutch physicians need the consent of rel-
atives for health decisions regarding people who lack
the capacity to decide for themselves (children as well
as adults), but physicians are ultimately responsible
for the decision-making and may bypass the relatives.
Dutch physicians interpret the act in different ways.
Some inform relatives and ask for permission, others
only inform them or, at the other extreme, give them
the decisive voice (de Vos et al. 2011), depending on
the nature of the decision. There is not always a dia-
logue between physicians and relatives about deci-
sions for incompetent patients, and relatives have
been bypassed by physicians in 5–37% of DNAR or-
ders (van Delden et al. 2006).
People with IDs cannot always take their own
decisions about the end of life, and relatives perceive
an increasing sense of responsibility to support them
in decision-making or to make decisions on their
behalf (Bekkema et al. 2015). Questions emerge about
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treatment decisions for those people with IDs who
depend on others for daily care and who are affected
by multiple conditions like epilepsy, osteoporosis and
dysphagia. However, a recent study in six acute NHS
service trusts in England questioned the arguments
on which DNAR decisions for people with IDs were
based, as these decisions seemed to be based on
inappropriate assumptions about quality of life
(Tuffrey-Wijne et al. 2014).
In the Netherlands, health care organisations for
people with IDs need clarity about DNAR decision-
making in terms of written orders and legal forms
(Van Dartel 2006), and the paid care staff has to know
what to do in emergency situations if they encounter
someone who may need to be resuscitated.
This study set out to clarify non-emergency DNAR
decision-making for people with IDs from the point of
view of ID physicians and trainees in the Netherlands.
As these physicians are experienced regarding medi-
cal care for people with IDs, this study focused on
their views. What are the considerations for making a
DNAR decision? Is quality of life a consideration and
for whom? Who is involved, in what way? What are




Participants were recruited through a request at the
annual meeting of the NVAVG (Dutch Association
for ID Physicians) followed by an email. The ID
physicians and trainees were invited either for a semi-
structured individual interview (I) or for a focus group
(FG) interview on the problems with DNAR
decisions for people with IDs. Seventeen ID
physicians responded. Because trainee ID physicians
were poorly represented, another focus group was
recruited from the Dutch vocational training
programme for ID physicians. To ﬁt in with the
schedules at the university, three trainee ID physician
groups were formed. First, individual interviews were
held to explore ideas, followed by focus groups to
generate in-depth discussion, and at the end of the
data-gathering process, an expert meeting (EM) was
held to test the outcomes. Those attending the expert
meeting were experienced regarding the subjects of
ID, decision-making and end-of-life decisions, and
included relatives, a professor of ID, a professor of
neonatology and decision-making, a professor of
ethics and ID, together with several ID physicians
with a speciﬁc background (engaged in vocational
training, an ethics advisory body and members of the
board of the professional organisation of ID
physicians). A total of 40 ID physicians and trainees
and 12 other experts took part in the study (for a
breakdown, see Table 1).
Data collection
An interview guide was developed, based on concepts
found in the literature, discussions with the project
members and a pilot interview (Lindlof and Taylor
2002). The guide was reviewed by researchers
familiar with end-of-life decision-making (a professor
of health law, a professor of ethics of health care and a
senior researcher of palliative care). This resulted in
four topics, namely the considerations used, the
decision-making process, the participants and their
roles, and the pitfalls (for details see Appendix 1). The
topic list was tested in two individual interviews with a
senior ID physician and a trainee physician, who were
not included in the ﬁnal sample. The same topic list
was used in both the semi-structured individual
interviews and the focus group interviews (Kitzinger
1995). All interviews were conducted in the work
settings or at the university between December 2009
and June 2012.
Individual interviews were held in order to generate
a list of key concepts. These were further explored in
focus group interviews, during which professionals
could discuss the whys and wherefores of DNAR
decisions with each other. The ﬁndings emerging
from this were then presented to and discussed in the
expert meeting. All individual interviews, focus group
interviews and the general discussion from the expert
meeting were recorded on a digital voice recorder and
transcribed verbatim. The individual interviews were
conducted by one of the authors, while the focus
group interviews and the expert meeting had an
independent moderator assisted by one or two of the
authors.
Analysis
All interviews were analysed following the procedures
of Grounded Theory, a qualitative research method
(Corbin and Strauss 2008). This method is used to
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develop a theory about a social phenomenon, based
on data from daily life (i.e. experiences), characterised
by a constant comparative method with open, axial
and selective coding phases. The qualitative analysis
involves examining and interpreting the data to elicit
meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical
knowledge (Corbin and Strauss 2008).
The four individual interviews were open-coded,
yielding a list of key words and associated concepts.
The analysis of the ﬁrst focus group interview with
experienced physicians ended in data saturation in the
open coding phase. At this point, it became clear that
behavioural disorders were sometimes a contributing
factor for DNAR, so we decided to hold a second
focus group session with experienced physicians to
explore this aspect further and to ensure that all
important considerations and problems were
identiﬁed. Of the three focus group interviews with
trainee ID physicians, only one was used for axial
coding because no new information emerged.
The third focus group was used to continue axial
coding, which was used to deﬁne a core category, and
to explore the relationships between the core category
and the other major categories. Selective coding took
place by reading the transcripts of focus groups 4 and
5 and rereading all the focus group interviews. This
conﬁrmed the major categories selected in the axial
coding phase and their relationships.
In May 2012, the results of the analyses were
presented at an expert meeting with a broad range of
Dutch ID physicians (members of the executive board
of the NVAVG, continuous education group, ethical
committee, vocational training programmes). The
experts were asked if they recognised the ﬁndings and
whether any important themes had been omitted. The
expert meeting was used to assess the categories
developed and deﬁne them more precisely. No new
categories emerged.
All interviews were analysed by the ﬁrst author and
one of the other members of the project group, or a
doctor interested in end-of-life decisions (researcher
triangulation). The codes were discussed by the two
researchers involved in the analysis of a particular
interview. If necessary, codes were rearranged and
reﬁned, and new concepts were added on the basis of
these discussions. The NVivo computer programme
was used to store and organise the data (Bazeley
2007).
Results
After analysis via open, axial and selective coding,
we identiﬁed three categories on which we built a
theory concerning the process of DNAR decision-
making. The core category we identiﬁed was
‘Patient-related considerations when issuing a
DNAR order’. This category was linked to two
other categories ‘The decision maker role ’ and ‘The
decision procedure in an organisational context’ (see
Fig. 1). The views of (experienced) physicians and
trainee physicians are presented together here, as the
analysis showed that the trainees views and
uncertainties did not differ from those of their
experienced colleagues. The quotes below were
retrieved from the focus groups (FG) with ID
physicians (P) and trainees (T), interviews (I) and
the expert meeting (EM).
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Table 1 Numbers and backgrounds of participants in interviews, focus groups and the expert meeting. Focus of interviews, focus groups and
expert meeting
Four semi-structured interviews Five focus groups One expert meeting
ID physicians 3 16 8
Trainee ID physicians 1 12
Others (4 relatives, 1 professor of ID,
1 professor of neonatology and decision-
making, 1 professor of ethics and ID; 5 ID
physicians with different backgrounds
(engaged in vocational training, ethics
advisory body, physicians' board)).
12
Focus Exploring uncertainties Discussing uncertainties Testing outcomes
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Patient-related considerations when issuing
Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation orders
The most important considerations for physicians
when issuing a DNAR order were longstanding
chronic medical conditions like congenital physical
defects and epilepsy. Considerations like
diminished life expectancy, advanced age and
severe decline in health status were often
mentioned.
‘My experience especially with clients with
profound and multiple intellectual disabilities is that
you often start such a discussion when they're poorly.
It doesn't mean they're terminally ill, but it's more that
he has pneumonia or he's ill, and the expectation is
often that it will recur. Then it's good to discuss this
and see what's to be done in this kind of situation.
And that often includes whether to resuscitate or not,
that's part of it.’ (FG1,P)
Physicians saw it as their task to assess what
constitutes a meaningful medical intervention.
‘In any case, we said that if she starts to experience
real impairments, starts to lose functions, that's when
the DNAR policy will be effectuated. As it is, the
relatives feel she has a comfortable life, so if anything
were to happen, they'd prefer .. [resuscitation]. And
as a doctor you then have to estimate whether that
would constitute a meaningful medical intervention.’
(I1,T)
Although they were unsure about the evidence,
the ID physicians estimated the chances of survival
through resuscitation to be very low, in the general
population as well as for people with multiple
disabilities. The whole process of resuscitation and
recovery was seen as very burdensome and not
suitable for those people who could not go through
the whole trajectory into Intensive Care and further
treatments. In addition, they expected a diminished
quality of life afterwards. As one ID physician said
about a successful resuscitation:‘The effect was that
she ended up at a lower level. So you could ask
yourself if it had had an effect. Well, it had an
effect: she was still alive, but at a lower level.’
(FG2,T)
Profound or severe intellectual disability was
considered to contribute to a DNAR decision,
because of brain damage after resuscitation coming
on top of existing brain problems. Physicians also
felt that people with profound and severe IDs were
more vulnerable and that quality of life was lower for
them.
‘Of course he had a very low intellectual level, I'd
say severely to profoundly disabled. So that means,
and I discussed this with his parents of course, that
the chances of successful resuscitation are naturally
much lower.’ (FG2,P)
Quality of life was difﬁcult for ID physicians to use
as a reason for issuing DNAR orders, and ID
physicians tended to leave the judgement to the
relatives.
‘To what extent are they suffering? That's often very
difﬁcult to say, especially if someone can't
communicate.’ (I1,T)
The quality of life of some relatives was reduced by
the need to support the person with IDs.
‘However, I think there's a sliding scale of quality of
life of the clients, but also that of relatives, who may
be so burdened by having a child with ID that they
feel like, if something should happen and he should
die of it…’ (FG2,P)
The physicians reported several important
considerations being mentioned by the relatives, such
as ‘he has had enough problems ’ and ‘let my child die
before I die’. According to the physicians, declining
health status was an important reason for relatives to
ask for DNAR. Sometimes, very severe behavioural
disorders were a reason for parents to ask for a DNAR
order.
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Figure 1 Results of the analysis.
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‘If the boy hadn't exhibited this highly problematic
autistic behaviour, I probably wouldn't have agreed
(to issue a DNAR order).’ (FG2,P)
Physicians hesitated about behavioural disorders as
an argument for DNAR, but some physicians could
understand the parents' wish and would issue such an
order.
‘So, erm, anyway, on one occasion I did agree to it.
Not so much based on, let's put it clearly, medical
indication, but on a very different, well … lack of
prospects in this whole complex of behavioural
problems. And well, the parents themselves also
mentioned this to some extent. And that's always a
dilemma I think. Anyway, in the end I, I also thought
that was a …. We then decided together that this [i.e.
not to resuscitate] might be a good option.’ (FG2,P)
The decision maker role
The impact of the ideas and opinions of the relatives
in the decision-making process was unclear. The
physicians experienced tensions between the ideas of
the relatives, their own professional arguments and
the physician's position as decision maker. Could a
relative decide whether or not a DNAR order would
be issued, especially if no urgent medical reasons
existed?
‘an excellent representative. But then she also
wanted us to … erm, although this person was in
reasonable health … to refrain from resuscitation.
Though there was no medical reason.’(I1,T)
The ID physicians wanted to prevent conﬂicts with
relatives, especially regarding quality of life, and left
evaluating this quality to the relatives. An ID
physician who wanted to make a DNAR decision
said:‘If the parents might feel we have a very good
rapport with our child. And we still see her smile,
don't we? Someone with a very low intellectual level,
and if I should then present them with a DNAR
order, that would create a problem with the parents.’
(FG1,P)
In this respect, however, the procedure was prone
to conﬂicts, and physicians were unsure of their legal
position. Some physicians asked the relatives to sign
the DNAR order, to conﬁrm that they had seen or
approved it. Other physicians did not ask this,
because they felt it was the doctor's professional
decision and they did not want to burden the
representative with this.
‘Sometimes, at the start of the consultation,
relatives say: now I'm the one who has to decide. So
that's a reason for me to explain again … that it's not
their decision, but that we just want their opinion as
one of the arguments to consider. And I've never
heard about anyone ﬁnding it difﬁcult to sign it. …
And personally, I also think well at least then it's clear
that they were present at the consultation and… okay,
I think we're not ofﬁcially obliged to.’ (I3,P)
Specialists in hospitals were less strict about issuing
a DNAR order, because they had other ideas about
quality of life. As one ID physician expressed it:
‘At the hospital they look downwards from the top
of the scale, while we look upwards from the bottom
end. What can they do? While they look at what
someone can't do. So they start talking about non-
resuscitation at a far earlier stage.’ (FG2,P)
Relatives were important as partners in the DNAR
process because they know the patient well. As one
doctor said:‘Yes, he had this deformed thorax. Well, if
that boy had very severe intellectual disabilities, and,
and, erm… well, what would be reasons for me not to
do it? No, I think the view, the relatives' view would
carry great weight.’ (I3,P)
The physicians felt that the views of paid care staff
were also important. People with IDs who lacked the
capacity to make their own end-of-life decisions were
not involved in the decision-making process.
The decision procedure in an organisational context
The DNAR orders were a part of a more
comprehensive set of end-of-life decisions, even if the
end of life was not necessarily imminent.
‘It's usually not purely about resuscitating or not.
It's always about a much wider set of decisions of
various kinds, and resuscitation is only one area.’
(FG1,P)
The physicians felt that it was not easy to ﬁnd the
right moment to discuss a DNAR order with relatives.
At the same time, hospitals and paramedics in
ambulances ask for clarity and want written
instructions. Suitable occasions for talking about
DNAR were reported to be the time when the person
with IDs moves into a residential setting, or at a care
plan meeting, or when a severe decline occurs in the
client's health status. The physicians perceived an
increasing tendency for relatives to ask for a DNAR
6
Journal of Intellectual Disability Research
A. M. A. Wagemans et al. • Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation orders for people with IDs
© 2016 MENCAP and International Association of the Scientiﬁc Study of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities and
John Wiley & Sons Ltd
order earlier in the life of their loved ones, even
though no life-threatening medical problems existed.
‘There are extreme cases where someone who's
admitted here, that there's a written statement from a
lawyer, sometimes even a notary public, with stamps
and signatures of erm…, saying the client must not be
resuscitated. So I then always explain that that has no
legal validity…’ (I2,P)
The physicians thought it was important to start
discussing DNAR in good time.
‘What I've noticed in recent years is that some
families want to get these decisions on paper at an
early stage. At a time when you think, well, this client
is still in good health. But in many cases, something
has happened in the family which meant that they had
to make such a decision about their father, mother,
grandfather or grandmother.’ (FG1)
Most physicians thought choking was an accident
and should be treated as a non-natural death,
implying that the person should be resuscitated even
if a DNAR order had been issued. In some health care
organisations, this was formally recorded in writing as
an exception in the DNAR procedure.
‘Resuscitation is assumed to apply only in a
situation of natural death. Anything beyond that, for
instance someone threatening to die as a consequence
of choking on something, you'll have to try your very
best to revive them or keep them alive.’ (I1,T)
The status of the order was not clear, because while
the attending physician might have issued an order in
advance, at the moment when the order should be
effectuated, bystanders might start resuscitation and
another doctor in charge would make the ultimate
decision to continue or terminate the resuscitation.
The respondents therefore felt that the ultimate
outcome of the DNAR procedure could be different
from that planned in advance.
‘In any case, the order always states that the
doctor treating the client at that moment… that they
can make their own decision. And though that
doctor can fall back on the carefully considered
DNAR order, they also have the authority to deviate
from it.’ (I2,P)
The physicians reported that, on the one hand,
DNAR is a medical end-of-life decision, but on
the other hand, at the moment the decision should
be put into effect, it is often the paid care staff
who have to act immediately in an emergency
situation.
‘Doctors may say it's a medical decision, but we're
not present at the crucial moment and someone else
has to make the decision.’ (EM,P)
The ID physicians felt that the most vulnerable part
of the decision-making trajectory was the moment the
decision should be effectuated.
Discussion
In this study, a theory was developed in which the
process of deliberation with all important stakeholders
(including people with IDs) about DNAR decisions is
the core of the DNAR procedure.
The theory we developed is grounded in the three
major categories, namely patient-related
considerations, the decision maker role and the
decision procedure in an organisational context.
First, with regard to patient-related considerations,
the arguments most commonly used by physicians
were the medical ones. Among the medical reasons
involved in DNAR decision-making, aspects like
futility of resuscitation and chances of success were
difﬁcult to interpret. The ID physicians in our study
felt unsure about evaluating medical conditions
against unknown and non-evidence-based chances of
survival. This is in agreement with the fact that
DNAR decisions are based on emerging problems
and not on survival chances (de Vos et al. 1998).
Physicians had their own ideas about quality of life,
like the view that people with profound and severe
IDs have a lower quality of life, but they were not sure
whether they could express and use this in the
decision-making process. ID physicians tended to
leave the assessment of the quality of life to the
relatives. The extent to which perceived quality of life
inﬂuences the physician's decision has been an issue
of concern in the UK, where cases have been
highlighted of inappropriate DNAR orders for people
with IDs (Meikle 2012, Tuffrey-Wijne et al.2014).
Insufﬁcient quality of life for a client, as perceived by
relatives whereas there are no severe medical
problems, was the most dubious and problematic
argument in the deliberation. There are no
instruments to measure quality of life for those who
cannot speak for themselves (Townsend-White et al.
2012). The concept of medical futility, which says that
the burden of a treatment has to be in balance with the
beneﬁts for the patient, is not very helpful when
weighing the burden of resuscitation against the
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quality of life of people with IDs. Discussions about
medical futility cannot be unilaterally settled by
physicians but are part of the continual redeﬁning of
the boundaries of decision-making authority between
physicians and patients (or next of kin). Disputes
around medical futility cannot easily be solved, but
are dynamic problems that should always be
addressed in mutual discussions (Misak et al. 2014).
People with IDs and their next of kin deserve an
honest and open debate which is tailored to each
individual and his or her circumstances. There is no
‘objective’ truth.
Second, regarding the decision maker role, ID
physicians would prefer a clearer legal position vis-à-
vis the relatives. In the Netherlands, this legal position
is clearly deﬁned in the Contract of Medical Treat-
ment Act (WGBO) (WGBO 1994) as the role of the
professional who is ultimately responsible for end-of-
life decisions, but apparently the ID physicians did
not have a clear idea of this. And if they had a clear
idea of their role, they found it hard to negotiate and
make a ﬁnal decision. In the current legal situation, it
might be important for physicians to accept the con-
sequences of the role of decision maker and to make
the decision, together with the patient (if he or she
can) or relatives (if the patient is not able to do so)
(Wagemans et al. 2013). Similar uncertainties about
roles and legislation have also been reported as im-
portant issues in other countries (Boslet et al. 2016).
Third, procedural and organisational aspects like
the status of a DNAR order, who signs the order and
what is the right moment to discuss such an order
remain to be resolved. A DNAR order is a pre-
emptively issued order and such a decision is made in
the tranquillity of advance care planning, but the
moment when resuscitation has to be started is an
emergency situation. The moment when bystanders
(including paid care staff) have to decide whether to
start resuscitation or not was regarded as the most
vulnerable part of the decision-making trajectory, and
the ultimate test for the procedure. As a consequence,
health care organisations should take responsibility
for the process of DNAR decision-making, and
should train and implement the DNAR procedure. Is
the order immediately available and clear to
bystanders and paramedics? Currently, some
hospitals are introducing red DNAR bracelets and
studying the outcomes of their use (Beelen 2012).
Bracelets might be a solution in hospitals, but are not
a solution for people outside a hospital, including
people with IDs. Some health care organisations have
indicated death by choking as an exception in their
DNAR policy, because choking is seen as a non-
natural death. However, it is becoming increasingly
clear that choking is inextricably linked to dysphagia
problems in many people with IDs, and is part of the
speciﬁc epidemiology (Chadwick et al. 2002).
Chances of survival, appraisal of resuscitation
(balance between quality of life and appropriateness
of intervention) and patient preferences are the three
concepts in decision-making in hospitals (de Vos
2001). These three concepts relate to the categories of
‘Patient-related considerations when issuing DNAR
orders’ and ‘The decision maker role’ of the theory
developed in our study, which encompasses medical
considerations (chances of survival), quality of life
and futility (appraisal of resuscitation) and patient
preferences as understood by relatives and paid care
staff. Although the way these concepts are phrased
differs between hospitals and ID care, the content of
the concepts is similar and therefore important for the
theory developed in our study on DNAR decision-
making. A recently published comprehensive report
about DNAR procedures and decision-making in
NHS practice in the United Kingdom (Perkins et al.
2016) concluded that DNAR decisions should be
seen as part of a broader framework of overall care
and treatment. This conclusion is broadly supported
by clinicians and other stakeholders. The authors
recommended that professionals should be trained in
the uncertainties of decision-making and should have
sufﬁcient time to engage in discussions and come to a
decision.
This is in accordance with the theory that we
developed, which shows that physicians feel unsure
about DNAR decisions for people with IDs and that
they have important reasons to be unsure. Because
there are so few certainties, it is very important to
carefully consider the decisions and discuss doubts
and arguments together with people with IDs, their
next of kin and other relevant persons involved. The
process examining the pros and cons, discussing the
insights obtained and coming to a decision takes time
and requires respect for each position. Physicians
should accept their role and shoulder the
responsibility in the decision-making process. They
should be systematically trained in decision-making
skills in situations of uncertainty instead of suggesting
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certainties. Advance care planning and clear
organisational procedures could support this process.
In sum, the process of deliberation with relevant
participants is of the utmost importance and needs a
prominent place in a DNAR procedure.
Strengths and limitations
In this study we interviewed ID physicians and not
other medical specialists or general practitioners.
Furthermore, only physicians interested in the subject
participated in the interviews, the focus group
interviews and the expert meeting. People with IDs
and paid care staff were not involved in this study, and
only a few relatives took part in the expert meeting.
However, because it is the ID physicians and trainees
who are used to caring for those people with IDs who
have major health problems, this study has provided
important insights into DNAR decision-making with
regard to people with IDs.
The study was limited to the Netherlands and the
way health care for people with IDs is organised in the
Netherlands. Although other countries do not have
specially trained ID physicians and therefore other
physicians are engaged in the care for people with
IDs, we feel that the results of our current study
among physicians with more than average experience
in health care for people with IDs are also valuable in
an international perspective.
Conclusion
We developed a theory which showed that for various
reasons, physicians feel unsure about DNAR
decisions for people with IDs. Important
uncertainties concern patient-related considerations
(including quality of life), the position of the physician
with regard to the relatives and uncertainties about
policies in the relevant organisations. Physicians
should be systematically trained in decision-making
skills in situations of uncertainty and accept their role
and responsibility in the decision-making process.
Physicians should express these uncertainties and,
within their professional organisation, develop a
method of advance care planning that offers room to
discuss the need for issuing DNARs. The procedures
within an organisation should be the subject of further
research in which they are described, implemented
and evaluated. Results of such studies may further
support physicians in giving proper attention to the
difﬁcult health decisions to be made, which is of the
utmost importance for people with IDs and their
next-of-kin.
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Appendix 1: List of interview topics about
DNAR decisions for people with intellectual
disabilities
Considerations
The considerations which lead to a DNAR decision.
Do only medical considerations play a role, or are
there other considerations, like quality of life? What
was the immediate argument to make the DNAR
decision?
Process
What aspects make this a good or a bad process?
Participants
Who makes the DNAR decision, who inﬂuences this
process? Is the person with intellectual disabilities
involved? Does paid care staff play a part in this
process?
Pitfalls
What are the pitfalls, problems and dilemmas for the
physician who has to make a DNAR decision?
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